Ousted PM Sheikh Hasina Seeks New Passport in Clearest Sign Yet of December Return to Bangladesh

For more than two years, Sheikh Hasina has lived in exile in India, the country she fled to in August 2024 when a student-led uprising ended her fifteen years in power in Bangladesh. In that time she has spoken rarely, denied the charges against her from a distance, and watched from abroad as her party was banned and a war-crimes court sentenced her to death in her absence. On Monday, November 9, 2026, that long silence broke in a new and practical way. Her lawyers wrote to Bangladesh’s mission in New Delhi asking for a new passport and a new national identity card, the documents she says she needs to come home in December. The request is, by the account of the Reuters report that first revealed it, her first formal communication of this kind since she fled, and it is the clearest step she has yet taken toward acting on a return she has promised for months. It also sets up a direct collision. Dhaka says it will not issue her travel documents and wants her back only through extradition, while Hasina says she will come home and surrender before a court. Between those two positions sit India, which has hosted her for two years, a High Commission that has not yet answered, and a country that remains deeply divided about her. Everything that follows — the letter, the court case, the extradition demand and the politics — turns on one question, and it is the question at the heart of the Sheikh Hasina new passport Bangladesh return December 2026 story.

1. What Hasina Asked For on Monday

1.1 The Letter to the High Commission

The request arrived in the form of a letter dated Monday, November 9, 2026, sent by Hasina’s lawyers at Matrix Chambers, a London-based law firm, to Preeti Rahman, the acting high commissioner at Bangladesh’s embassy in New Delhi. Reuters reported that it had seen a copy of the letter, and its account was quickly picked up by Al Jazeera and other outlets, which described the move as the clearest sign yet that Hasina intends to keep her promise to return home in December. The letter was sent by her lawyer Steven Powles KC, according to reports of the correspondence, and it asked the mission to take the necessary steps to issue a new Bangladeshi passport and a new National Identity Card, known as the NID, for Hasina. The lawyers asked for the applications to be processed expeditiously, and they framed the request on the basis of her Bangladeshi nationality and in accordance with obligations under international human rights instruments. The significance of the letter lies as much in its existence as in its contents. Hasina has not made a formal request of this kind to Bangladeshi authorities at any point since she fled the country in August 2024, and the letter is therefore the first time she has engaged the machinery of the state she once led in order to arrange her own return.

1.2 Why New Documents Are Needed

The letter explains the request by pointing to what the lawyers describe as the reported revocation of Hasina’s existing Bangladeshi passport and National Identity Card by the interim government and other authorities. In the words quoted from the letter, the lawyers wrote that in view of that reported revocation, they respectfully requested that the mission take the necessary steps to issue new documents for their client. A passport and a national identity card are the two documents a Bangladeshi citizen ordinarily needs to travel internationally and to prove identity at home, and without them a return journey would be difficult to arrange through normal channels. The request for both documents together suggests that Hasina’s team is trying to remove every practical obstacle to travel before announcing a date, rather than testing the position with a single application. It also puts the High Commission in New Delhi in the position of having to answer a direct question about the status of a former prime minister’s citizenship documents, a question the mission had not answered publicly at the time the story was reported. Whether the documents were in fact revoked, and on what authority, has not been independently confirmed, and the interim government has not published a detailed account of the revocation, so that part of the story still rests on the lawyers’ own description.

2. The December Return Plan

2.1 What She Has Said About Surrendering

Hasina has told Reuters that she plans to return to Bangladesh and surrender before a court, and her aides repeated on Monday that the exact date of her return would be announced once the necessary formalities had been completed. The December timetable is not new. On July 29, she said she was determined to return to Bangladesh by December, and in an email interview with The Associated Press this month she reaffirmed that she would return in December regardless of the risks. The consistency of that message over several months is part of what makes the passport request significant: it is the first concrete administrative step attached to a promise that had previously existed only in words. An aide to Hasina described the passport request as a significant step toward her homecoming and said she remains determined to return by December. The language of surrender is deliberate, because it frames the return as a voluntary submission to the courts rather than a capture or a forced handover, and that framing matters for how the return would be understood both inside Bangladesh and abroad. It is also, however, a promise that depends on others: a surrender requires a court willing to receive her, a journey she is permitted to make, and a government that does not intercept her first.

2.2 The Formalities Still to Complete

The aides’ reference to formalities is vague, and deliberately so, because the steps between a passport application and a return flight are not spelled out in any of the reporting. The formalities could include the processing of the passport and identity card themselves, arrangements for travel documents that would be accepted at the border, and coordination with the court before which she says she will surrender. None of those steps has been confirmed as complete, and no date has been announced. The absence of a date is itself informative, because it shows that the passport request is a step toward a return rather than the final step before one. If the High Commission declines to process the applications, the formalities could stall at the first hurdle, and the December timetable would become difficult to keep. If the documents are issued, the question would move to whether Hasina can travel, and whether the Bangladeshi authorities would accept her arrival as a surrender or treat it as an opportunity to take her into custody on their own terms. For now, the only certainty is that the formalities have been started and that the date, when it comes, will be announced by her side rather than by Dhaka.

3. Two Years in Exile in India

3.1 The August 2024 Uprising

Hasina’s exile began on August 5, 2024, when she fled Bangladesh after a student-led uprising that had grown over weeks from protests about government jobs into a mass movement against her rule. The protests began over a quota system for public sector jobs and escalated as security forces cracked down on demonstrators, with hundreds of people reported killed during the unrest. The scale of the protests eventually overwhelmed the government’s ability to contain them, and Hasina left the country by air for India as crowds moved on the capital, Dhaka, ending a period of about fifteen years in which she had dominated Bangladeshi politics as prime minister. The uprising was one of the most consequential political events in Bangladesh’s history, not only because it removed a leader who had held power continuously since 2009, but because it was driven substantially by students and young people who had grown up under her rule. The crackdown that preceded her departure is now the central fact of the legal case against her, and it is the reason her return is framed as a surrender rather than a homecoming in the ordinary sense. Her departure left a political vacuum that was filled by an interim government, and the country has been living with the consequences of that sudden change ever since.

3.2 Life in Exile Since Then

For the two years since her flight, Hasina has lived in India, largely out of public view, while Bangladesh has moved on without her. She has given occasional interviews and statements from exile, in which she has denied the charges against her and insisted that she intends to return, but she has not appeared in person in Bangladesh and has not engaged directly with the authorities there until this week’s letter. During the same period, her party, the Awami League, has been banned, removing from the political scene the organisation through which she governed for fifteen years. The interim government that took power after her departure has pursued legal cases against her and other figures from her administration, and it has made her return a matter of public policy, insisting that she should be brought back through extradition rather than allowed to return on her own terms. Her exile has therefore been both a personal condition and a political problem: she is physically safe in India but legally exposed at home, and every statement she makes about returning raises the same unresolved question of how a former prime minister who faces a death sentence can come back to the country she once ruled.

4. The Death Sentence Waiting at Home

4.1 The Tribunal’s November 2025 Verdict

The most serious obstacle to Hasina’s return is the sentence imposed on her in November 2025, when Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal sentenced her to death in absentia for crimes against humanity, ruling that she was responsible for ordering the crackdown on protesters during the 2024 uprising. The verdict was delivered in her absence, because she was already in exile in India, and it followed proceedings in which she was tried without being present to defend herself in person. She has denied the charges from exile, and her supporters have questioned the fairness of a trial conducted in absentia, but the sentence stands as a formal judgment of the court, and it is the reason her aides speak of surrender: a return would place her directly within the reach of the court that condemned her. The death sentence is not a minor legal detail that can be set aside by a passport application. It is the central fact that gives the return plan its gravity, because it means that the journey Hasina is proposing would take her from safety in India to a country where the highest court dealing with her case has already ordered her execution. That is why the language of surrender matters, and why the question of what happens on arrival is the most consequential unanswered question in the whole story.

4.2 What Surrender Would Mean in Practice

What surrender before a court would actually involve has not been explained in any detail, and the mechanics are far from clear. In ordinary circumstances, a person who surrenders to a court is taken into custody, and the court then decides questions such as bail, appeal and the timetable for further proceedings. In Hasina’s case, the ordinary circumstances do not apply, because the court has already passed a death sentence, and it is not clear whether surrender would lead to a fresh hearing, an appeal, a retrial or the enforcement of the existing sentence. Her lawyers have not publicly set out the legal strategy they would pursue after a surrender, and the Bangladeshi authorities have not said how they would receive her if she arrived voluntarily. The uncertainty extends to the practicalities of arrival itself: which airport she would land at, whether she would be met by police or by court officials, and whether she would be taken into custody immediately. All of these questions would need answers before a return could be carried out safely, and none of them has been answered in the reporting so far. The promise to surrender is therefore best understood as a statement of intent rather than a settled plan, and its meaning will only become clear when the legal and practical arrangements are made public.

5. Dhaka’s Answer: Extradition, Not a Passport

5.1 The Government’s Public Position

The government in Dhaka has been clear that it does not intend to help Hasina return on her own terms. On Thursday, November 5, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Humaiun Kobir, told reporters that the government would not issue Hasina a passport or a travel pass, saying she would be brought back under the existing extradition treaty between Bangladesh and India. On Sunday, November 8, the Law Minister, Md Asaduzzaman, said the government would take all necessary legal steps to bring Hasina back under the prisoner exchange treaty. The two statements together amount to a consistent position: Dhaka wants Hasina returned through a formal state-to-state process, in which India hands her over, rather than through a voluntary journey arranged by Hasina herself with documents issued by a Bangladeshi mission. The position has a legal logic, because it treats her as a convicted person who should be returned to face the sentence imposed on her, rather than as a citizen exercising a right to travel home. It also has a political logic, because a voluntary return on Hasina’s own timetable would allow her to present herself as a leader coming home to face justice, while an extradition would present her as a fugitive being brought back by the state.

5.2 The Treaty Route and Its Limits

The extradition route Dhaka is invoking depends on the treaty between Bangladesh and India, and on India’s willingness to act on it, and neither of those things is straightforward. Extradition treaties ordinarily allow one country to request the handover of a person accused or convicted of a crime, but the requested country retains discretion, and political considerations often shape the outcome. India has hosted Hasina for two years without handing her over, and there is no public sign that it intends to do so now. The Home Minister, Salahuddin Ahmed, was quoted by the New Age daily as saying that the foreign and law ministries are reviewing Hasina’s applications, which suggests that Dhaka has not yet taken a final decision on the passport request itself, even as its ministers have publicly ruled out issuing travel documents. The review leaves open a narrow possibility that the applications could be processed despite the public statements, but it also shows that the decision is being handled across ministries rather than by the High Commission alone. For the extradition route to work, India would have to agree to a request it has so far not acted on, and the treaty process would have to move faster than the December timetable Hasina has set for herself. Neither condition is assured.

6. A Banned Party and a Divided Country

6.1 The Awami League After the Uprising

The party Hasina led for decades, the Awami League, is now banned, and that fact shapes everything about her possible return. A banned party cannot campaign, cannot field candidates and cannot organise openly, which means that Hasina would be returning to a political landscape in which her own organisation has no legal standing. The ban was one of the most consequential decisions taken after the uprising, because it removed from formal politics the party that had governed Bangladesh for fifteen years and that still commands significant support among parts of the population. The ban has not removed the party’s supporters, and it has not settled the question of what place the Awami League should have in Bangladesh’s future, but it has made Hasina’s return a more complicated proposition: she would be coming back as the leader of a banned organisation, facing a death sentence, into a country whose government has already decided that her party has no legitimate role. Whether the ban would be enforced against her personally on her return, and whether her supporters would be able to rally around her, are questions that have not been tested, because she has not yet returned to test them.

6.2 The Political Stakes of a Return

A return by Hasina would be one of the most politically charged events in Bangladesh since the uprising itself, and its consequences are difficult to predict. For her supporters, her arrival would be a moment of vindication, a sign that their leader has not abandoned them and is willing to face the courts. For her opponents, and for the interim government, it would be a challenge: a former prime minister returning voluntarily would command enormous attention, and any move against her would be watched closely at home and abroad. The return could energise the Awami League’s base and reopen debates about the uprising, the crackdown and the legitimacy of the interim government, or it could end quickly in custody, with Hasina taken into detention and the political moment passing. The risk of unrest is real, because a figure as divisive as Hasina attracts both loyalty and anger, and large crowds could gather either to welcome her or to protest against her. The government will be weighing those risks as it decides how to respond to the passport request, and the calculation is not only legal but political: the way Dhaka handles her return will shape how the country remembers the uprising and its aftermath.

7. India Caught in the Middle

7.1 Delhi’s Delicate Position

India has been caught in the middle of this dispute since the day Hasina arrived in August 2024, and the passport request does nothing to ease that position. Delhi has given shelter to a former prime minister who fled a popular uprising, and in doing so it has taken on a guest whose presence complicates its relationship with the government that replaced her. Bangladesh has repeatedly asked for her return, and India has not complied, which has kept a strain in the bilateral relationship alive for two years. At the same time, handing over a former head of government to face a death sentence would be a grave step for any country, and India has reasons of its own to move carefully, including its interests in the region and its own political considerations. The passport request adds a new dimension, because it was made to a Bangladeshi mission on Indian soil, and it asks a Bangladeshi official in Delhi to take a decision that the government in Dhaka has already said it opposes. India is not the addressee of the letter, but it is the country in which the whole question will be decided, and its attitude toward Hasina’s travel will matter as much as Dhaka’s attitude toward her documents.

7.2 What the High Commission Must Decide

The immediate decision now rests with the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi, and in particular with Preeti Rahman, the acting high commissioner to whom the letter was addressed. The mission has not yet said whether it will process the passport and identity card applications, and Dhaka has given no sign of changing its position that extradition is the only route. The High Commission is in an awkward position: it is an arm of the Bangladeshi state, and its instructions ordinarily come from Dhaka, yet it has been asked to act on a request that Dhaka’s ministers have publicly rejected. The Home Minister’s statement that the foreign and law ministries are reviewing the applications suggests that the decision will be taken in Dhaka rather than in Delhi, and that the mission will wait for instructions before acting. That leaves the request in a holding pattern, with the lawyers waiting for an answer, Hasina waiting for documents, and the December deadline drawing closer. The longer the review takes, the harder it will be for Hasina to keep to her timetable, and the more the passport request will look like a gesture rather than a practical step toward travel.

8. What Remains Unconfirmed

8.1 The Questions Without Answers

Almost everything that would turn this passport request into an actual return remains unconfirmed. It is not known whether the High Commission will process the applications, whether new documents will be issued, or whether the interim government will overrule the mission and refuse them outright. It is not known what date Hasina would travel, what route she would take, or whether she would be permitted to board a flight to Dhaka. It is not known how she would be received on arrival, whether she would be taken into custody immediately, or whether a court would hear her case afresh. It is not known whether the death sentence would be enforced, appealed or set aside, or whether her surrender would open the way to a retrial. It is not known what effect her return would have on the Awami League, on the interim government, or on the streets of Dhaka. Each of these questions depends on decisions that have not yet been taken, by people who have not yet announced them, and the answers could change the story completely. For now, the only confirmed facts are the letter itself, the promise to return in December, the sentence waiting at home, and Dhaka’s insistence on extradition.

8.2 What to Watch Next

The next signs to watch are straightforward. The first is any response from the High Commission in New Delhi, or from the foreign and law ministries in Dhaka, on whether the passport and identity card applications will be processed. The second is any announcement from Hasina’s aides of a specific return date, which they have said will come once the formalities are complete. The third is any further statement from Dhaka about extradition, and any sign of movement in the treaty process with India. The fourth is any legal filing or court statement about how a surrender would be handled, which would indicate whether the courts are preparing to receive her. And the fifth is the reaction inside Bangladesh, from the Awami League’s supporters, from the interim government, and from the students and activists who led the uprising, because their response will shape whether a return is treated as a legal event or a political crisis. December is only weeks away, so these answers will have to come quickly if the timetable is to hold, and each one will narrow the gap between a promise and a journey.

Sheikh Hasina’s letter to the High Commission in New Delhi is a small administrative act with very large consequences. It turns a promise to return into a formal request, it forces Dhaka to answer a question it had hoped to settle by extradition, and it puts India and the courts in the middle of a dispute that has been frozen for two years. Whether the documents are issued, whether the journey happens, and whether the return ends in a courtroom, a prison cell or a political reckoning, none of it is settled yet. The coming weeks will provide the answers.

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