Hegseth Heads to Manila as Asia-Pacific Allies Test US Resolve at Cebu Defence Talks

The Hegseth Manila ADMM-Plus defence talks bring a familiar question into sharper focus this week: how far will the United States go to reassure its friends in Asia, and how much will those friends be asked to do for themselves? US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth is travelling to the Philippines for the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Cebu, scheduled for Wednesday and Thursday, 28 and 29 October 2026. It takes place alongside a parallel meeting for ASEAN members alone, and it arrives when several governments in the region are watching Washington closely, weighing its promises against its demands, and trying to judge what deterrence will mean in practice rather than in speeches.

This article sets out what is known about the Cebu meetings, who is taking part, what each side says it wants, and what remains undecided. It does not claim that any agreement has been reached, that any joint statement has been adopted, or that any decision on the most sensitive questions has already been made. Where reporting leaves a point open, this article says so. That restraint matters, because defence meetings are often judged later by the gap between expectation and outcome, and the most useful guide before the talks is a clear account of the agenda, the participants and the limits of what has been confirmed.

Why Cebu Matters This Week

Cebu matters because the meeting is not a routine photo opportunity. It brings together defence ministers and senior representatives from across Southeast Asia and from eight partner countries, in a format designed for discussion of regional security rather than for a single bilateral negotiation. The timing adds weight. The Philippines chairs ASEAN this year, so Manila is both host and agenda-setter in a period when maritime disputes, internal conflict in Myanmar, tensions involving North Korea, and wider questions about American power in Asia are all competing for attention. A meeting hosted by the chair therefore becomes a test of whether a broad and diverse group can still hold a common conversation.

The presence of the US defence secretary also changes the dynamic. When Washington sends its most senior defence official, allies and partners tend to read the visit as a signal about commitment, and they also use the sidelines to press their own concerns directly. At the same time, a senior visit raises the stakes for the United States itself. Every bilateral meeting, every public remark and every omission is examined for clues about priorities, about burden-sharing, and about how Washington intends to balance its commitments in Asia with pressures elsewhere in the world.

A chair-year meeting in a changed region

A chair year gives the Philippines a particular responsibility. It must try to keep discussions constructive among countries that do not always agree, while also advancing its own national interests. That balancing act is visible in the way Manila has framed the gathering. Its broad priority, as described by its defence spokesman, is strengthening the alliance with the United States, rather than a narrow list of deliverables. That framing leaves room for discussion, but it also means observers should be cautious about expecting a dramatic announcement. Chair years are often judged by whether they keep dialogue open and prevent disagreements from hardening, as much as by any single document.

The region has also changed in ways that shape the mood in Cebu. Partners in Asia and the Pacific have been recalibrating their positions after the US-Israel war on Iran and after American criticism of allies. That context does not determine what will happen in Cebu, but it helps explain why reassurance and burden-sharing are likely to be discussed together. Governments want to know that the United States remains engaged, and they also want to understand what Washington expects from them in return. When those two questions are left vague, uncertainty grows, and when they are answered too bluntly, friction can grow instead.

What ADMM-Plus is and what it is not

The ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus, known as ADMM-Plus, is a forum for defence dialogue. It is not a military alliance, and it is not a treaty organisation with binding enforcement powers. Its value lies in bringing defence leaders together, in creating habits of contact between militaries that might otherwise interact mainly through crises, and in providing a setting where disagreements can be raised without immediately becoming public confrontations. That character is both a strength and a limitation. It allows a wide range of countries to participate, but it also means that progress is often gradual and that statements can be more general than the underlying disputes.

Understanding that distinction helps to set realistic expectations for Cebu. A successful ADMM-Plus meeting may produce useful bilateral conversations, clearer signals about priorities, and a shared sense of what issues need further work. It does not, by itself, settle a maritime dispute, end a civil war, or resolve a decades-old question about command arrangements. Readers should therefore treat any early claim of a breakthrough with care, and should look instead for concrete follow-up meetings, agreed work programmes, or specific bilateral understandings that are confirmed afterwards.

Who Will Be in the Room

The breadth of ADMM-Plus is one of its defining features. The forum brings together the members of ASEAN and a group of dialogue partners that includes major powers with very different interests. That breadth is why the meeting can be useful, and also why it can be difficult. Countries that are rivals in other settings sit in the same room, and the chair must manage both the formal agenda and the informal exchanges that often matter just as much. The list of participants therefore tells a story about the region itself: a Southeast Asian core, surrounded by partners whose engagement shapes the security environment.

The 11 ASEAN members

The 11 ASEAN members taking part are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam. Each brings a different security perspective. Some are directly involved in South China Sea disputes. Others are more concerned with internal stability, economic resilience, or the risk of being drawn into great-power competition. Some have close defence ties with the United States, while others maintain a more cautious distance. That diversity means that ASEAN unity is often a work in progress rather than a fixed position, and it explains why the chair’s role in finding common language is so important.

For the Philippines, hosting as chair also puts its own disputes and priorities in the spotlight. Manila has a direct interest in maritime issues and in the effort to finalise a code of conduct with China. At the same time, it must be seen to act for the group as a whole. That dual role can create tension, especially when a host country’s national concerns overlap with the agenda it is supposed to manage. How Manila navigates that tension in Cebu will be watched closely, not only by its ASEAN partners but also by the dialogue partners who attend.

The eight dialogue partners

The eight dialogue partners are Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States. Together with the ASEAN members, they form a group of 19 participants. That composition means the meeting is not simply a US-ASEAN conversation, nor is it a forum dominated by any single power. Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand are close partners of the United States in different ways. India maintains its own independent approach. China and Russia bring perspectives that often differ sharply from Washington’s. The result is a room in which agreement, when it occurs, has to be built across real differences.

The level of representation also matters, and in this case one difference has already attracted attention. China is sending its defence attache from its Manila embassy to the 13th ADMM-Plus on 29 October, rather than its defence minister. That is a notable contrast with previous years, when Minister Li Shangfu attended in 2024 and 2025. Representation is not the same as policy, but it is one of the signals that participants and observers use to judge how much priority a government places on a particular meeting, and it will be part of the discussion around Cebu even if it is not on the formal agenda.

The Pentagon’s Stated Aims: Deterrence, Alliances and Burden-Sharing

According to Pentagon framing reported ahead of the visit, Hegseth is expected to hold bilateral and multilateral meetings intended to strengthen deterrence, advance alliances and partnerships, expand burden-sharing, and reaffirm a commitment to peace through strength in the Pacific. Those four phrases are worth unpacking, because each carries a different implication. Deterrence is about dissuading adversaries from action. Alliances and partnerships are about the relationships that make deterrence credible. Burden-sharing is about who pays, who provides forces, and who takes responsibility. Peace through strength is the broader doctrine that links them together.

For allies, the test will be whether those aims are presented as a shared project or as a set of demands. A shared project invites discussion about capabilities, planning and coordination. A set of demands can feel like a transaction, in which support is conditional on spending or on political alignment. The distinction may be subtle in public statements, but it is often clear in private meetings, where ministers can ask direct questions about timelines, about American forces, and about what Washington will do if a crisis arises. Cebu provides a setting for those questions, even if the answers are not made public.

Peace through strength, in practice

Peace through strength, as a phrase, suggests that a credible military posture makes conflict less likely. In practice, that idea depends on many details that are not captured by a slogan. It depends on the readiness of forces, on the quality of joint exercises, on intelligence sharing, on logistics, and on the political willingness to act together if deterrence fails. It also depends on communication with potential adversaries, so that strength is understood as a warning rather than as a provocation. In Cebu, the practical questions are likely to be more important than the slogan itself: which capabilities, which exercises, which forms of cooperation, and on what timetable.

There is also a regional dimension to this idea. Strength in the Pacific is not measured only by American forces. It is measured by the combined effect of allied and partner capabilities, by access arrangements, by infrastructure, and by the ability to respond quickly across a vast maritime region. That is why multilateral meetings matter alongside bilateral ones. They allow Washington to test whether its partners share its assessment of threats, and they allow partners to test whether Washington understands their constraints, including domestic politics, economic pressures and the risk of escalation.

What burden-sharing means for allies

Burden-sharing is one of the most contested ideas in alliance politics, because it can mean different things to different governments. For the United States, it often means that allies should spend more on defence, provide more capabilities, and take on a larger share of regional security tasks. For allies, it can mean a fairer distribution of costs, but it can also raise questions about sovereignty, about the pace of spending increases, and about whether greater contributions will be matched by greater consultation. Those questions are not new, but they have gained urgency as defence budgets rise and as governments face competing domestic demands.

In Cebu, burden-sharing is therefore likely to be discussed in general terms in public and in more specific terms in private. Public statements may emphasise partnership and shared responsibility. Private conversations may focus on particular programmes, on modernisation plans, and on the practical limits that each government faces. Observers should be careful not to treat a general commitment to burden-sharing as evidence of a specific agreement. The real test will be what governments do after Cebu, in budgets, in procurement decisions, and in the exercises and operations they choose to undertake together.

Manila’s Priorities: Alliance, Modernisation and Capacity

For Manila, the Cebu meetings are an opportunity to strengthen a long-standing alliance while also advancing its own defence needs. The Philippines has been investing in military modernisation, and it faces maritime pressures that make capability and capacity building a practical concern rather than an abstract one. At the same time, it must manage its relationships within ASEAN and with China, and it must avoid being seen as simply taking sides in a larger competition. Its approach to Cebu therefore reflects both its alliance with the United States and its role as ASEAN chair.

Arsenio Andolong’s broad priority

Philippine defence spokesman Arsenio Andolong has said that strengthening the alliance is Manila’s broad priority for the meetings. He has also indicated that military modernisation and future capability and capacity building could be on the agenda. That language is deliberately broad. It signals a direction without committing Manila to a specific outcome, and it leaves space for discussion about what kind of support, cooperation or coordination would be most useful. It also reflects the reality that modernisation is a long-term process, shaped by budgets, procurement, training and maintenance, rather than by a single meeting.

Capability and capacity building can cover a wide range of activities, from training and exercises to equipment, logistics, maritime domain awareness and cyber defence. The precise mix matters, because different capabilities address different threats. A country concerned about maritime disputes may prioritise surveillance, patrol and response capabilities. A country concerned about internal security may prioritise different tools. In Cebu, the discussion is therefore likely to touch on priorities as well as on general principles, even if the details remain confidential.

Why Manila is not forecasting outcomes

Andolong declined to forecast outcomes, and that caution is understandable. Forecasting outcomes before a multilateral meeting can create expectations that are difficult to meet, and it can limit flexibility in negotiations. It can also be interpreted by other participants as an attempt to set the agenda unilaterally. By keeping its public language broad, Manila preserves room for genuine discussion and avoids the risk of being judged against a promise it did not make. That approach may frustrate observers looking for a headline, but it is a common and often sensible approach for a host.

The caution also reflects the nature of ADMM-Plus itself. Because the forum includes countries with different interests, outcomes are often the product of compromise rather than of a single country’s plan. A host that predicts a specific result before discussions begin may find that other participants resist being presented with a fait accompli. Manila’s restraint therefore tells us something about how the meeting is likely to work: through discussion, through bilateral sidelines, and through gradual convergence, rather than through a single dramatic decision.

The Seoul Sideline: OPCON and the December Meeting

One of the most closely watched sideline meetings in Cebu is expected to be between Hegseth and South Korea’s Defence Minister Kang Shin-chul. The two are expected to meet on the sidelines of the gathering, and wartime operational control, known as OPCON, is high on the agenda. OPCON transfer is a long-running and sensitive issue in the US-South Korea alliance. It concerns the conditions under which wartime command of combined forces would transfer from the United States to South Korea, and it touches on questions of capability, readiness, alliance structure and political trust.

Seoul is reported to want to finalise the second phase of a three-stage, conditions-based plan, and to announce a target year at the December Security Consultative Meeting in Washington. That December meeting is therefore an important milestone to watch, even though it lies beyond Cebu. What happens in Cebu may help shape the tone and the preparatory work for December, but it does not by itself settle the question. Readers should distinguish between progress in discussions and a final decision, because the two are often confused in reporting about alliance negotiations.

A three-stage, conditions-based plan

A conditions-based plan means that transfer does not happen on a fixed date alone. It happens when certain conditions are judged to have been met. The three-stage structure reflects that approach: stages are completed as capabilities and arrangements are verified, rather than simply as time passes. That design is intended to reassure both sides. It gives South Korea a pathway towards greater command responsibility, while giving the United States a framework for ensuring that the combined defence posture remains strong throughout the transition.

The second phase is therefore a significant step, but it is not the final step. Finalising a phase would indicate that a set of conditions has been assessed and that work can move to the next stage. Announcing a target year at the December meeting would be a further signal, giving both governments a planning horizon. Even then, a target year is not the same as a completed transfer. It is a goal around which planning can be organised, and it can be adjusted if conditions change. That distinction is important for anyone trying to judge the pace of change in the alliance.

Where differences remain

Differences over whether conditions are met remain, and no outcome is confirmed yet. That is a crucial point. Both governments may agree on the principle of a conditions-based approach while disagreeing on the assessment of specific capabilities, on the risks involved, or on the timing. Those differences are not necessarily a sign of alliance crisis. They are a normal part of a complex negotiation, in which military assessments, political considerations and strategic judgments all play a role. What matters is whether the two sides can manage those differences through discussion, rather than allowing them to become public disputes.

The Cebu sideline meeting should therefore be seen as part of a longer process, not as a final decision point. It provides an opportunity for Hegseth and Kang to discuss progress, to identify areas where assessments differ, and to agree on what work needs to be done before December. Any reporting that claims a decision has already been made should be treated with caution unless it is confirmed by both governments. Until then, the most accurate description is that discussions are continuing, that Seoul has a stated aim for December, and that differences remain unresolved.

China’s Lower-Level Presence and Its Message

China’s representation at Cebu has become a talking point in its own right. Instead of sending its defence minister, Beijing is sending its defence attache from its embassy in Manila to the 13th ADMM-Plus on 29 October. That is a lower level of representation than in 2024 and 2025, when Minister Li Shangfu attended. The change has been described in reported analysis as a downgrade, and it has prompted discussion about what Beijing intends to signal. At the same time, it is important to separate what is known from what is inferred.

What is known is the level of representation and the fact that Beijing has given no reason for the minister’s absence. What is not confirmed is the motive. Governments change their representation for many reasons, including scheduling, domestic priorities and diplomatic signalling, and observers do not always know which reason applies. Treating the change as a confirmed motive would go beyond the evidence. The careful approach is to report the change, to note the analysis that describes it as a downgrade, and to be clear that the motive has not been confirmed.

Attache instead of minister

A defence attache is a senior military diplomat based at an embassy, and such officials play an important role in defence diplomacy. However, an attache does not carry the same political authority as a defence minister. A minister can make political commitments, can speak for the government at the highest defence level, and can engage in peer-to-peer discussions with counterparts. An attache can represent a position, can participate in discussions, and can report back, but cannot substitute for ministerial-level engagement in the same way. That difference is why the level of representation is noticed, even when the formal agenda remains the same.

For other participants, the practical effect may be limited in some respects and significant in others. Formal sessions can still proceed, and bilateral exchanges can still take place at the appropriate level. At the same time, the absence of a minister can limit the scope for high-level bilateral meetings, and it can affect the tone of discussions about sensitive issues. It can also be read, rightly or wrongly, as a sign of how much priority Beijing places on this particular forum at this particular moment. That reading may itself influence how other governments approach the meeting.

ASEAN centrality, and warnings about misuse

Beijing has said that it supports ASEAN centrality and dialogue. ASEAN centrality is the idea that ASEAN should remain at the centre of regional architecture, rather than being sidelined by great-power arrangements. That language is familiar in regional diplomacy, and it is used by many governments, including those that disagree on other issues. Support for centrality does not, by itself, resolve disagreements about maritime disputes or about the role of external powers. It is a principle about process and about the place of Southeast Asian institutions, and its meaning is often contested in practice.

Beijing has also separately warned against misusing platforms and against hijacking ASEAN. That warning, as reported, reflects a concern that regional forums could be used to advance the agenda of one power at the expense of others. Other governments, however, may see the same forums as a legitimate place to raise concerns about security, including maritime issues and alliance cooperation. The tension between those views is part of the background to Cebu. It helps explain why language in any joint discussion is carefully negotiated, and why participants pay close attention to how a meeting is framed in public.

The Wider Regional Agenda

Beyond the bilateral meetings and the question of representation, Cebu has a wider regional agenda. That agenda includes South China Sea maritime disputes, Myanmar’s civil war, North Korea issues, and the broader recalibration by Asia-Pacific partners after the US-Israel war on Iran and US criticism of allies. Each of these issues is complex in its own right, and each interacts with the others. A discussion about maritime security, for example, cannot be fully separated from questions about alliance commitments, about economic interests, and about the role of China in the region.

The breadth of the agenda is both a challenge and an opportunity. It is a challenge because no single meeting can resolve all of these issues, and because trying to do so can lead to vague language that satisfies no one. It is an opportunity because the meeting allows defence leaders to see how different issues are connected, and to understand how their counterparts prioritise risks. For many participants, the most valuable outcome may not be a statement on any one issue, but a clearer sense of where others stand across the range of issues.

South China Sea and the code of conduct

The South China Sea is expected to be front and centre in Cebu. That assessment has been offered by William Yang of the International Crisis Group, speaking via Al Jazeera, and it reflects the centrality of maritime disputes to regional security. The Philippines, as chair, is pushing to finalise a code of conduct with China. A code of conduct is intended to provide rules and procedures to manage disputes and to reduce the risk of incidents at sea. It is not, by itself, a settlement of competing claims. It is a framework for managing them, and its value depends on whether it is clear, whether it is binding in practice, and whether all parties follow it.

Finalising such a code has proved difficult over many years, and there is no confirmed agreement in Cebu. The difficulty reflects the depth of disagreement about claims, about enforcement, and about the role of external powers. It also reflects the different interests of ASEAN members, some of which are claimants and some of which are not. The Philippines’ push as chair should therefore be understood as an effort to keep the process moving, rather than as a guarantee of success. Observers should watch for language about progress, about timelines, and about further negotiations, rather than assuming that a final code will emerge from this meeting.

Maritime incidents, coast guard activities, fishing disputes and resource exploration all feed into the broader discussion. Defence ministers are not the only officials involved in maritime policy, but they play a key role in managing military and coast guard interactions. Their discussions in Cebu can therefore affect the risk of miscalculation at sea, even if they do not resolve the underlying legal and political disputes. That risk management function is one of the less visible but more important roles of a defence forum.

Myanmar, North Korea and recalibration after the Iran war

Myanmar’s civil war remains a major concern for ASEAN. It has created humanitarian suffering, displacement and instability, and it has tested ASEAN’s ability to respond collectively. Defence ministers are not the primary actors in a political settlement, but they are involved in discussions about security, about borders, and about the regional consequences of conflict. The war also raises questions about ASEAN’s internal cohesion, because members have different views on how to engage with Myanmar’s military authorities and with other actors in the country.

North Korea issues add another layer of complexity. They involve nuclear and missile programmes, regional deterrence, and the role of the US-South Korea and US-Japan alliances. For South Korea and Japan, in particular, North Korea is a direct security concern. For other ASEAN members, it is a regional risk that affects stability more broadly. The discussion in Cebu is therefore likely to reflect both the specific concerns of Northeast Asian participants and the wider interest of Southeast Asian countries in avoiding escalation.

Running through all of this is the recalibration by Asia-Pacific partners after the US-Israel war on Iran and US criticism of allies. Recalibration does not mean abandonment of alliances, but it does mean that partners are reassessing their assumptions, their hedging strategies and their expectations of American support. Some may seek to diversify partnerships. Others may seek to strengthen existing alliances while also building new ones. Still others may adopt a more cautious public posture while continuing practical cooperation. Cebu offers a window into that process, because it brings many of those partners together in one place.

What to Watch Next and What Is Not Yet Decided

As the Cebu meetings unfold, the most useful questions are not only about what is said in formal sessions, but also about what happens on the sidelines, what is confirmed afterwards, and what is left for later meetings. Defence diplomacy often works through a sequence of gatherings, and Cebu is one step in that sequence. The December Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, for example, is already a focal point for the OPCON discussion. Further US-China diplomatic engagement later in the year is another part of the broader context, although it should not be treated as an outcome of Cebu itself.

It is important to be clear about what has not been decided. No deal, joint statement, code of conduct agreement or OPCON decision has been confirmed as reached. That does not mean that discussions are unimportant. It means that the significance of Cebu will depend on the follow-up, on the clarity of any statements that are issued, and on the actions that governments take in the weeks and months that follow. Readers should look for confirmed statements from governments, rather than relying on speculation about what may have been discussed behind closed doors.

Separate ASEAN-US and ASEAN-Japan sessions

In addition to the main ADMM-Plus gathering, a separate ASEAN-US informal defence ministers’ meeting is scheduled, along with an ASEAN-Japan session. These smaller formats can be useful because they allow more focused discussion among a subset of participants. An ASEAN-US informal meeting, for example, provides a setting for Washington and Southeast Asian ministers to discuss alliance and partnership issues without the full range of dialogue partners present. An ASEAN-Japan session similarly allows Japan and ASEAN members to discuss their own defence cooperation, which has grown in recent years.

These sessions also illustrate the layered nature of regional defence diplomacy. ADMM-Plus is the broadest forum, but it sits alongside many other bilateral and minilateral meetings. Each layer serves a different purpose, and together they form a network of contacts that can be activated in a crisis. The challenge for participants is to ensure that these layers reinforce each other, rather than creating confusion or competing agendas. How the separate sessions in Cebu relate to the main meeting will be part of the story to watch.

India bilaterals and later US-China engagement

India bilateral sideline meetings to review defence ties are also scheduled. India is an important dialogue partner, with its own security interests in the Indo-Pacific, its own relationships with ASEAN members, and its own approach to great-power competition. Bilateral reviews of defence ties can cover exercises, training, equipment cooperation and strategic dialogue. They are a reminder that ADMM-Plus is not only about the United States and China, but also about the many other relationships that shape regional security.

Finally, the broader context only, clearly flagged as context and not as an outcome, is that the talks come ahead of further US-China diplomatic engagement later in the year. That engagement may shape, and may be shaped by, the atmosphere in Cebu. It does not mean that Cebu will produce a US-China agreement, and it should not be reported as such. What it does mean is that participants in Cebu are aware that their discussions take place within a longer diplomatic calendar, in which each meeting can affect the tone of the next. That awareness may encourage caution, or it may encourage bolder discussion, depending on how governments judge the moment.

In the end, the Cebu defence talks will be judged not by the number of meetings held, but by whether they leave allies more confident, partners more clear about expectations, and the region more stable than before. That is a high standard, and it is one that cannot be assessed on the first day of a meeting. It requires attention to what is confirmed, to what is left open, and to what governments do next. For now, the most accurate account is a measured one: Hegseth is heading to Manila, allies are testing US resolve, and the key questions about deterrence, burden-sharing, OPCON, the South China Sea and China’s representation remain open, to be worked through in Cebu and in the meetings that follow.

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